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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ELIZABETH FRANDSEN TRINNAMAN and CHERYL FRANDSEN GRIFFITHS,

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
12302

EDITH S. CLINGER and
HERSCHEL J. CLINGER,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT REGARDING NEW
MATERIAL RAISED IN RESPONDENTS'
BRIEF
Despite the language of the controlling case,
Haight v. Pearson, 11 Utah 51, 39 P. 479 (1895)
"that contracts in which a trustee both buys and sells
to himself are void" (emphasis supplied), and despite
the language of U.C.A. 1953, 75-10-6 "No executor
or administrator shall, directly or indirectly, purchase
any property of the estate he represents ... " respondents insist that the sale is merely voidable. By this
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posture, it appears, respondents hope to impose the
reasoning of foreign state courts concerned with other
areas of probate law upon this court's concern and
discipline over executors. Primarily, respondents seem
to urge that if the sale is merely voidable, this proceeding is a nullity because the court confirmed the sale
and that confirmation cannot be collaterally attacked
unless the court lacked jurisdiction. Such an interpretation is not sustained either by reason or the cases.
Similarly, the equitable doctrines raised in respondents' Points III to V are not applied by the overwhelming majority of cases dealing with the duties of
an executor or administrator. It is a long standing
common law principle that:
"where property of decedent is sold under
order of the court the personal representative
cannot lawfully become the purchaser at his
own sale; and . . . a purchase by the personal
representative, either directly or indirectly,
will not be sustained regardless of the absence of a fraudulent or wrongful intent. 34
C. J. S. Executors and Administrators,§ 599,
pp. 562, 563.

REPLY TO RESPONDENTS'
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because this case was decided in the lower court
on the Statute of Limitations issue, no finding was
made by the court as to whether the executrix had fully
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disclosed to the probate court her interest in the property sold to her husband and the fact of her relationship to the buyer of the property. Somewhat equivocal testimony by the executrix, Mrs. Clinger, (Tr. 93,
94) was offered to show that she believed that the court
had been informed. 0 b j ection was entered on the
ground that the evidence was self-serving, but the
court permitted the answer. The evidence is in conflict
with the language of the court's order of confirmation
(R. 46) and the petition for confirmation (R. 46) and
inferences that may arise from the fact that the property was sold to Herschel J. Clinger rather than to the
executrix, Edith S. Clinger, who owned the other onehalf interest in the property, or to the married couple
jointly.
ARGUMENT
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II
THE ORDER CONFIRMING THE
SALE OF THE REAL PROPERTY IS
NOT CONCLUSIVE AND MAY BE
COLLATERALLY ATTACKED.
In arguing this point, respondents do not produce
authority on the question of whether or not an administrator's purchase from the estate can be sanctified by
the decree of the probate court without a determinaion of the self-dealing issue to prevent its investigation
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at a later date. Denlinger v. Luton, 219 P.2d 495 (Cal.
1950) involved a sale which was questioned after confirmation because successful bidders at the sale were
daughter and son-in-law of the executrix and other
grounds. The quotation from 31 Am. Jur.2d § 389 was
likewise concerned with objections to a sale which became res judicata upon confirmation. Only the citation of Haight v. Pearson, supra, is the relevant Utah
law; and its broad prohibition of trustee buying and
selling to himself reflect the clear Utah policy, buttressed by section 75-10-6.

It is difficult to find cases dealing directly with
the effect of the court's order upon the administrator's
sale to himself, but the cases are summarized from the
effect of review in 1 A.L.R. 2d 1062:
"The fraud involved in undisclosed self-dealing is said to invalidate the judgment not primarily because it is a fraud on those interested
in the estate but because it is a fraud on the
court entrusted with the res. It is the duty of
the fiduciary to disclose the material facts.
If he procures a judgment by breach of this
duty he procures it by fraud, and the same
invalidly attaches to it as in the case of other
fraudulent judgments. Brown v. Fidelity Union Trust Co. ( 1939) 126 N.J. Eq. 406, 9
A.2d 311 ...

"It is perhaps because of this view that a person interested in the estate is seldom barred
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from complaining against the judgment, or
from attacking it collaterally, by failure to
inquire into the fiduciary's dealings and guard
against this sort of fraud. Clearly laches
after knowledge of the fraud may bar him,
but passive reliance on regularity in the administration of the estate will not. This is implied in most of the cases ... "
And at page 1068 of the same annotation:
"§ 7 The rule is universal that where a fiduciary has sold land of the estate to himself,
or to a third person acting for him, or otherwise in a transaction in which he had an adverse interest, those interested in the estate
may pursue the property in equity as held
upon a constructive trust, notwithstanding a
judgment allowing the account of the fiduciary, provided the account did not disclose
the interest of the fiduciary in the transaction,
the issue of his interest was not litigated in a
hearing on the account, and the facts were unknown to the complaints when the account was
allowed.''
In addition to the cases cited in the above annotation, see "lJIIassachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v.

Keefe, 127 A.2d 266 (N.H. 1957); In re Hubbel's
Will, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951); Donnelly
v. Ritzendollar, 14 N.J. 96, 101A.2d1 (1954}; Hutchings v. Louisville Trust Co., Ky., 276 S.W. 2d 461;
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Boyd v. Matthews, 299 Ark. 112, 388 S.W.2d 102;
Strudthoff v. Yates, 28 Cal.2d 602, 170 P.2d 873; Edwards v. Collins, 207 Ga. 204, 60 S.E.2d 337; Alburger
v. Crane, 5 N.J. 573, 76 A.2d 812; Morehead v. Harris,
262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174.
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT III
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ESTOPPE TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY
OF THE SALE.
Respondents contend that by accepting the benefits distributed to them, appellants estopped themselves
from asserting invalidity of a sale the proceeds from
which were included in the estate. The citations of their
brief on this point clearly preclude such a broad application of the principle of estoppel. At the very least,
knowledge (full knowledge of the facts, in the language of the cases cited at 2 ALR2d 133) on the part
of the beneficiaries is essentional to estoppel. The record shows that they had no such knowledge until 1969;
and the failure to question the administration of the
estate, even had they been of an age of responsibility,
would not have been sufficient to invoke estoppel
against them. See cases at 2 ALR2d 140 and followmg.
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REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT IV
THE SALE IS VOID AND SALE
FALLS WITHIN NO EXCEPTION
TO U.C.A. 1953, 75-10-6.
There is no statutory exception to U.C.A. 1953,
75-10-6, although statutes have been enacted in other
jurisdictions permitting a personal representative to
purchase at a sale under the order of court, Gravet v.
Gonsoulin, 10 La. App. 553, 119 So. 785; Huger v.
Huger, 30 S.C. Eq. 217.
Respondents assert that the rule against self-dealing does not apply where the testator knowingly places
his trust in a position which he knew might conflict
with the interest of the trust or beneficiaries. This may
fairly represent the language from the case of In re
Steele's Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 103 A.2d 409. Similarly,
the language could be applied to In re Flagg's Estate,
365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411. But a reading of the cases
shows the inapplicability of their facts and their philosophy to the instant case.
The respondent held no interest in conflict with
the interest of the estate in the property. She merely
owned a one-half undivided interest in the entire property. Admittedly, as a property owner she would have
had some concern as to the ownership of the remaining one-half interest in the property, but such was not
the financial interest in the estate property illustrated

8

by cases considering valid self-interest by the executor.
In the Flagg case, the testator left shares of stock in
a corporation in trust for his daughter and one of the
trustees held controlling interest in the corporation. In
the Steele case, the co-trustee and beneficiary of a trust
was a corporate officer and a vote for a stock dividend
benefited her life tenancy while rendering the market
value of the trust stock.
Another group of cases permits the representative,
who is also an heir, to purchase the property where it
may be necessary for his own protection. In such a
case, the purchase by him will be upheld "if the sale
is fairly conducted, unless .... his purchase would result to the disadvantage and injury of others having
an interest in the property." 34 C.J.S. § 599, p. 564.
Although the executrix was a beneficiary of certain
personalty under the will of her sister, Probate File No.
10,007, she had no personal interest in the estate real
property to protect under this exception. See Warrick
v. Woodham, 243 Ala. 585, 11 So.2d 150, 144 ALR
1223.
In the Warrick case, the interest which the executor had in the estate grew out of the fact that he was
husband to the deceased's daughter, who was a beneficiary under the will; and he sold the property to her.
This case has not been cited by a jurisdiction outside
of Alabama since it was decided in 1942. It contrasts
markedly with the majority and apparently better
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reasoned rule demonstrated by the language of In re
Fullton's Will, 253, App. Div. 494, 2 N.Y.S.2d 917,
919:

"A trustee's first duty is to his trust. It is
elemental that he cannot transfer trust property to himself. individually. We see little, if
any, difference in a trustee conveying trust
property to her husband. Such a sale at once
raises a doubt as to its validity and is presumed
to be a violation of the trust. While it may
not actually have been a fraudulent transaction, only the fullest and fairest disclosure
of all the facts will establish that. A conflict
of interests exists. The mere showing of the
relationship raises the presumption and gives
the beneficiary of the trust the right to have
the transfer set aside. The courts have said that
this was to avoid the opportunity for actual
fraud and its easy conceahnent by a trustee,
and that such sales should be avoided as a matter of public policy. In principle, such a
transfer is constructively fraudulent and may
be canceled at the beneficiary's option."
See also ALI Restatement of the Law of Trusts,
Vol. 1, Section 170, Subsection 1 ( e).
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT V
PLAINTIFFS l\1A Y SEEK RELIEF
SETTING ASIDE THE SALE '\TITH-
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OUT FIRST TENDERING PAYMENT OF THE PURCHASE PRICE.
Respondents cite us to "a long line of California
appellate decisions" which have "uniformly followed
the weight of authority upholding the principle." The
cases cited are concerned with sales upon mortgage
foreclosures where the mortgagee seeks to set aside the
sale without first offering to satisfy his obligation under the mortgage. It is not pointed out to us wherein
this line of cases could be applied to an accounting by
an executrix under a will; nor does it seem feasible
prior to a determination of the amount of loss.
CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as this case is before this court on an
appeal from a Summary Judgment solely on the
Statute of Limitations issue and inasmuch as no findings were made on the subject matter of most of respondents' brief, particularly with respect to efforts
made by the administratrix to reveal or conceal the
transaction in question, the case must be remanded to
the trial court with instruction to require an accounting.

Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
R.M. CHILD

